What are the British armed forces for?
The defence command paper commits the military perhaps too widely
Last week’s newsletter on the disintegrating international order began with Ed West’s definition of the armed forces’ reason for being: “literally killing foreigners”. It may be a joke, but unlike other bloated mission statements it is clear, precise and achievable. You can kill foreigners.
Sifting through the various documents that the government dumped on the internet in the last few weeks, I’ve searched for similar clarity on the British armed forces’ purpose for the next decade. The wonks have spent more than a year mulling the question, so what is the answer?
The defence command paper, like its older brother in the integrated review, is clear-ish about the threats facing Britain and liberal democracies. “Russia continues to pose the greatest nuclear, conventional military and sub-threshold threat to European security,” is about as straightforward as you can wish for given the paper’s author.
The position on China, our other great potential enemy, is necessarily more ambiguous. Economically the Asian giant is important to us and the world, and so long as the situation remains they will prove a collaborator as much as a competitor.
Many Western strategists actively pursued economic development in China in the hopes that its emerging middle classes would demand political reform, neutralising it as an ideological threat. Some undervalued cynic probably pointed out at the time that this might equip an authoritarian state with the world’s biggest economy and military. Clearly there were too many optimists in the room.
“The significant impact of China’s military modernisation (which is proceeding faster than any other nation) and growing international assertiveness within the Indo-Pacific region will pose an increasing challenge,” is about the least you can say of it. “Existential threat”, would be the most.
In other problems, Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes are said to endanger global stability. Health emergencies are listed as a chance for “malign states” to increase their influence, as we’ve seen with the Covid-19 pandemic. The document also notes that climate change and biodiversity loss “represent a global challenge”, which is one way to describe possible human extinction.
If you think that British defence chiefs are highly omnivorous in their appetites, you’d be right. The Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific might take star billing in the reports, but the desire appears to be for Britain to remain a global force with deployments worldwide.
One can be too pessimistic about our capabilities, and Britain remains a medium power. Nicholas Mazzei, a former officer in the British Army, highlighted in a recent Right Dishonourable podcast that one thing that makes us an attractive ally to the United States is that we have military bases dotted around the world, for example in Gibraltar, Cyprus and the Falklands. Such assets should be maintained.
It is, however, not obvious why we are sending an aircraft carrier to the Pacific when China may well have five in service by 2030 as part of the world’s biggest navy. Indeed, while the need for economic and diplomatic engagement in the Indo-Pacific is obvious, the deployment of our military resources in the region has a less clear purpose.
“An army formation that makes Russia stand up and take notice has impact; another carrier strike group occasionally deployed in the Pacific will not have the same impact on China, nor will it exert the same level of coercive control on Russia,” is the verdict of Peter Roberts, director of military sciences at the RUSI think tank. Given limited resources, the British military needs to prioritise.
This is not to say that strategic direction is entirely absent from these reviews. Following last year’s Integrated Operating Concept, there is a great deal about joined up thinking, as well as the importance of cyber and space. As well as throwing money at the problem, the armed forces will focus more on the skills of its workforce, even at the expense of overall personnel numbers.
Other investments and upgrades are legion. The nuclear deterrent is to be expanded as it undergoes a revamp. The current Vanguard-class nuclear submarines will be replaced with four new Dreadnought-class submarines. Major investments in a new generation of anti-submarine warfare frigates will help NATO to protect its flanks.
More broadly there is a focus on “a more proactive, forward deployed, persistent presence”, and a continuous campaigning mindset. This is a departure from the previous focus on major conflict and warfighting.
These caveats aside, the wide-ranging nature of the strategy seems to indicate that the armed forces will have many objectives. In Europe, Russia must be deterred from aggression. Chinese assertiveness must be pushed back on. At the same time we must train, equip and support many other smaller countries to enhance regional security.
The question is whether our armed forces can handle the bear and the dragon at the same time as other lesser-known animals. One can only hope chasing such beasts in tandem is easier than hunting the proverbial pair of rabbits.
Seditious Bristolians. There is something pleasing about the idea that Bristol is an especially rebellious city, kicking off at the slightest excuse. Robert Gore-Langton’s piece for the Spectator makes this case, with the expected jibes at rich students.
Brexit Brown. Gordon Brown has enjoyed a better reputation out of office than in it, as seems the rule for prime ministers. The claim by historian Robert Tombs that he laid the groundwork for Brexit may enhance or diminish this perception, depending on your view.
Readers will be doubtless be hoping that the government stops churning out defence-related whitepapers so that I can talk about something else. I promise to do so if enough of you share this piece.
Jimmy